








































Regulating Two-Sided Markets:  
An Empirical Investigation 
 
Santiago Carbó Valverde, Sujit Chakravorti, 










 Regulating Two-Sided Markets:  
An Empirical Investigation  
 
 
Santiago Carbó Valverde 
Sujit Chakravorti 
Francisco Rodriguez Fernandez 
 
 
April 12, 2010 
 
Abstract 
Two-sided market theory predicts that platforms may subsidize the participation of one type of 
agent by extracting surplus from another type to internalize indirect network externalities. 
However, few empirical studies exist to evaluate the impact of government intervention in these 
markets. We use confidential bank-level data to study the impact of government-encouraged fee 
reductions for payment card services when merchant acceptance is not complete. We find that 
consumer and merchant welfare improved when the interchange fees, transfers among banks, 
were reduced. Furthermore, bank revenues increased because the increase in the number of 
transactions offset the decrease in the per-transaction revenue. 
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1.  Introduction 
The economics of how platforms set prices for two or more types of agents is receiving 
increasing attention by economists and policymakers. This literature, commonly referred to as 
two-sided markets or platforms, blends together the network economic literature with the 
multiproduct firm literature.
1 Rochet and Tirole (2003) define a two-sided market when the price 
structure, or the share that each type of agent pays the platform, affects the total volume of 
transactions. Furthermore, one set of agents is unable to negotiate transfers with the other set of 
agents. Examples of two-sided platforms include media portals (eyeballs and advertisers), 
heterosexual dating clubs (men and women), and payment networks (consumers and merchants).   
The simultaneous adoption of services such as dating or payment services provided by a 
platform to two sets of agents often involves indirect network externalities. In other words, one 
type of agent benefits when the other type of agent participates. Often platforms will subsidize 
the participation of one set of agents by extracting surplus from the other set of agents to 
internalize this externality. For example, online news providers may not charge eyeballs that 
view their sites but earn all of their revenue from advertisers.   
In this article, we empirically test whether government intervention to change the market-
determined platform fees is socially efficient. We ask the following questions. First, do more 
agents adopt when their fee is reduced? Second, does the other type of agents reduce their 
adoption and usage because of higher fees? Third, what is the impact on the platform revenues 
from government-encouraged fee reductions? 
We focus on government-encouraged fee reductions in the payment card market.  
Specifically, we study the effects of several regulatory interventions in Spain during 1997 to 
                                                 
1 For a broader description of this market, see Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Jullien (2001), Rochet 
and Tirole (2006), Rysman (2009), and Weyl (2010).   2
2007. We ask whether reductions in interchange fees can improve social welfare when the 
network adoption externality has not been completely internalized. To our knowledge, we are the 
first to use bank-level data to study multiple government-induced reductions in interchange fees. 
Interchange fees are paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank. We use a 
simultaneous equations approach to test the impact of lower interchange fees on adoption and 
usage decisions of consumers and merchants. Furthermore, we also study the impact of lower 
interchange fees on issuer and acquirer revenues. 
Our main results are as follows. First, we find strong evidence suggesting that merchant 
acceptance has increased because of a reduction in interchange fees. Second, consumer adoption 
of debit cards did not significantly decrease over the period because of lower interchange fee 
revenue for issuers but credit card adoption increased dramatically during the period of 
interchange fee reductions. Third, bank payment revenues from debit and credit card services are 
positively related to increased transactions resulting from lower interchange fees.  
The structure of fees in two-sided markets has been addressed in the theoretical literature 
but empirical testing of fees structures in these markets has been limited. Our results suggest that 
even platforms may benefit from changing the price structure especially in markets where 
adoption by the side that pays a greater share of the fee is reduced. Furthermore, the price 
structure may not be constant during emerging and mature stages of an industry’s development. 
Finally, we remain agnostic on the sharing of surplus when the adoption and usage externality 
have been internalized.  
Our article is organized in the following way. In the next section, we discuss several 
theoretical economic models. In section 3, we discuss the market for payment services in Spain 
along with the regulatory actions taken by the public authorities. We discuss our empirical   3
strategy in section 4. We describe our dataset in section 5. In section 6, we present our results. 
We discuss robustness tests in section 7. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in section 8.  
 
2.  Relevant Literature   
There are many industries that can be characterized as a two-sided market. The key 
aspect of these markets is the presence of an indirect network externality and how fee structures 
internalize this externality. Whether the fees are per-transaction, fixed, or a combination of both 
differs across industries.
2 Not surprisingly, the type of fee affects the adoption and usage along 
with the optimal price structures. 
  In this article, we focus on the payment card industry. Payment networks are comprised 
of consumers, their financial institutions (known as issuers), merchants, their financial 
institutions (known as acquirers) and a network operator or platform. A consumer makes a 
purchase from a merchant. Generally, the merchant charges the same price regardless of the type 
of payment instrument used to make the purchase. Consumers often pay annual membership fees 
to their financial institutions for credit cards and may pay service charges for a bundle of services 
associated with transactions accounts. Merchants pay fees known as merchant discounts. 
Acquirers pay interchange fees to issuers.   
The lower bound of the merchant discount is the interchange fee and is set by the 
platform. Generally, decreases or increases in interchange fees are passed onto merchants in the 
form of lower or higher fees, respectively. Hence, merchants have protested against increases in 
interchange fees and continue to challenge the setting of these fees. On the other hand, a 
reduction in the interchange fee will likely result in higher fees for cardholders.  
                                                 
2 See Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Rysman (2009).   4
Payment card networks continue to face antitrust scrutiny by public authorities regarding 
the pricing of payment services (Bradford and Hayashi, 2008). Public authorities are concerned 
about the collective setting of interchange fees by banks to extract rents from merchants. If these 
rents are used to attract consumers to use cards, society may be better off if such a shift is 
socially optimal.   
Most of the economic literature on payment card networks to date has been theoretical. 
Baxter (1983) observed that payment cards should be adopted if the aggregate benefits to 
consumers and merchants are greater or equal to the aggregate costs to serve them. Furthermore, 
consumers would adopt payment cards if their benefit is greater than their fee and merchants 
would adopt if their benefits were greater than their fee. This condition does not necessarily 
imply that costs be split evenly between consumers and merchants. This literature generally 
argues that the interchange fee is a balancing mechanism that is necessary to bring both sides on 
board (Baxter, 1983 and Rochet and Tirole, 2002).   
  A key assumption made in this literature is that consumers and merchants are unable to 
negotiate prices based on the type of payment instrument. If merchants are able to pass on 
payment costs, the level of interchange fees will not affect the usage of payment cards assuming 
that the proportion of merchants accepting cards is constant.
3  Given that merchants may be 
contractually unable to set prices based on payment instrument used in many jurisdictions or 
merchants often do not differentiate prices in jurisdictions where they can, the level of the 
interchange fee affects the adoption and usage of payment cards.   
Some theoretical two-sided models predict that competition may actually worsen social 
welfare. Rochet and Tirole (2004) and Guthrie and Wright (2007) find that network competition 
                                                 
3 See Gans and King (2003) for a more general treatment of when interchange fees are neutral. Katz (2005) 
questions this result based on the level of pass-through between issuers and acquirers to consumers and merchants, 
respectively. Bolt and Chakravorti (2008a) consider different levels of pass-through in a theoretical model.   5
may yield a price structure that has a lower social welfare than when there is only one network. 
If competition is too strong on the consumer side, the network may extract too much from 
merchants resulting in higher than socially optimal interchange fees. Merchants generally accept 
cards from multiple networks and consumers choose their preferred issuer and network. 
Therefore, competition on the consumer side may be more intense especially intra network 
competition when merchants cannot discriminate card acceptance by issuer (Katz, 2005). In 
addition, intense competition from issuers may result in lower costs and in some cases rewards to 
consumers that may be subsidized by merchants or those consumers that avail long-term credit. 
  Empirical research on the impact of changes in interchange fees on usage is almost non-
existent.  Hayes (2007) uses structural break analysis to study the impact of interchange fee 
regulation in Australia.  He uses aggregate level monthly data on the changes in share of credit 
card purchases.  Given the maturity of the Australian market, he finds no evidence of structural 
breaks resulting from an almost 50 percent mandated decrease in interchange fees. 
However, there are some empirical investigations of other two-sided markets (Argentesi 
and Filistucchi, 2007; Dubois, Hernandez-Perez, and Ivaldi, 2007; Kaiser and Wright, 2006; and 
Rysman, 2004). Our approach is similar to Rysman (2004) who uses a simultaneous equation 
estimation technique study the tradeoffs between consumers and advertisers in the market for 
yellow pages. He estimates the consumer demand for yellow page usage as a function of 
advertising and the inverse demand for advertising as a function of consumer usage. He is able to 
identify the positive network effect. He also studies welfare tradeoffs between competition and 
monopoly providers of yellow pages.   
   6
2.  Spanish Regulatory Developments  
Spain represents a unique laboratory to study the effects of encouraged or mandated 
interchange fee ceilings on consumer and merchant payment card adoption and usage. Spanish 
residents rely heavily on cash to make purchases. Carbó Valverde et al. (2003) report that 
residents of Spain have traditionally been more cash intensive than residents of countries of 
similar size and geography. For 2000, they report that Spain had a currency to GDP ratio of 8.9 
percent compared to 6.2 percent for Germany, 4.7 percent for Portugal, and 3.2 percent for 
France. Similarly, Spain had far fewer non-cash transactions per capita per year at 56 than 
Germany (177), Portugal (94), and France (196). Comparatively, Spain’s acceptance of debit 
cards by merchants was extremely low resulting in low card usage.
 4  
The antitrust authorities argued that the low level of adoption of cards in Spain and other 
European countries is directly related to the collective setting of interchange fees. European 
antitrust authorities have tried to reduce surplus extraction by issuers in recent years by 
encouraging the reduction in interchange fees via domestic antitrust and government resolutions. 
Since the late 1990s, there have been four important events that significantly affected the setting 
of interchange fees in the Spanish payment card industry.   
All government-initiated events are summarized in Table 1. These agreements were 
sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of the Economy or the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and 
Trade. In motivating this decision, the TDC stated “interchange fees will be reduced permitting 
an adequate adoption by merchants and, ultimately, by cardholders” (TDC Decision of 26 April 
2000, No. A 264/99).  In May 1999, the Spanish government promoted an agreement between 
the three payment networks and the main merchant associations to reduce maximum multilateral 
                                                 
4 As noted by the Bank of Spain (2007), the Secretary of State for Commerce and Tourism created a Special 
Commission to study the usage of payment instruments in Spain and the transition from cash to card payments.   7
interchange fees to 2.75 percent in July 2002. This agreement was accepted by Spain’s Antitrust 
Authority (TDC) in 2000 (TDC Decision of 26 April 2000, No. A 264/99). Maximum 
interchange fees varied significantly across merchant categories. For example, in 2002, the 
average interchange fee was 2.79% in casinos and 0.63% in gas stations.   
To some extent the evolution of Spain’s interchange fee regulation was affected by a 
European Commission (EC) decision regarding European Union (EU)-wide cross-border 
interchange fees in 2002.
5 In 2002, the main government intervention was triggered by the 
European Commission (EC) Decision 2002/914/EC of 24 July, regarding Case No. 
COMP/29.373 – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee.
6 Following these 
investigations of the EC, the TDC followed suit and requested the Spanish payment card 
networks to provide information on Visa’s methodology for determining interchange fee for 
Visa.   
In May 2003, the Spanish Congress requested the TDC to investigate the setting of 
interchange fees and to follow the basic principles that the European Commission adopted for 
EU-wide cross-border interchange fees. The TDC issued a report on competition in commercial 
activities and related payments (TDC, 2003) and refused several proposals of the networks on 
their setting of interchange fees. In December 2003, the TDC announced that the ‘special 
authorization’ for the setting of interchange fees of the three payment card networks were going 
to be revoked although this decision was not formally undertaken until 2005.  
                                                 
5 In July 2002, the EC cleared Visa’s European cross-border interchange fees and offered some insights on the 
position of EU competition authorities with regard to the setting of interchange fees. The EC found that there were 
upward pressures on the level of interchange fees.  More recently, MasterCard and the European Commission have 
agreed on a substantially lower multilateral interchange fees for cross-border European transactions.  In addition, the 
European Commission has opened new discussions with Visa about these fees. 
6 For a summary of these decisions, see Arruñada (2005).   8
The third important event occurred from 2003 until 2005, when the networks tried to 
maintain their ‘special authorization’ for collective determination of interchange fees from the 
TDC. Several attempts from the industry to maintain their ‘special authorization’ for the setting 
of interchange fees were refused during these two years and the networks were requested to set 
levels of interchange fees that only reflect operating and fraud costs.  
The most important regulatory action for the Spanish payment card industry took place in 
December 2005. The debate started in April 2005, when the TDC refused the proposals of the 
networks regarding how interchange fees were set and asked them to use a cost-based approach. 
The network operators were also requested to make a distinction between debit and credit card 
interchange fees. Some TDC resolutions required the card networks to only include two costs 
when setting domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIFs): a fixed cost for processing each 
transaction and a variable ad valorem cost for the risk of fraud (TDC Decisions of 11 April 2005, 
No. A 314/02, No. A 318/2002and No. A 287/00).  As a consequence of this resolution, the 
Spanish government promoted an agreement between payment networks and merchant 
associations to establish a timetable to progressively reduce interchange and merchant fees from 
2005 to 2009.   
From January 2006 to December 2008, the highest interchange fee levels were reduced in 
a stepwise manner. Furthermore, a distinction was made between debit and credit interchange 
fees, with the former being a fixed amount per transaction and the latter being a percentage 
amount per transaction.
7 For merchants with an annual value of point of sale card payment 
receipts less than €100 million, the credit card interchange fee decreased from 1.40% per 
transaction in 2006 to 0.35% in 2009 while for debit card fees were reduced from €0.53 per 
transaction to €0.35 per transaction regardless of the purchase amount. From 2009 onwards, each 
                                                 
7 See Shy and Wang (2010) for more discussion of proportional and fixed transaction fees.   9




Adoption and usage: main figures 
During 1997-2007, debit card transactions increased from 156 million to 863 million and 
credit card transactions increased from 138 million to 1.037 billion. The reduction in interchange 
fees increased the acceptance and usage of payment cards. As shown in Table 2, from 1997 to 
2007, the number of debit cards has increased by 40.9% while the number of credit cards has 
increased by 207.1%. During the same period, the number of transactions increased substantially 
with debit card transactions being five times larger in 2007 than in 1997 while credit card 
transactions increased by seven times. Furthermore, the average number of POS transactions per 
card per year has increased from 7.1 to 27.8 during the same period.  
Consumer preferences for debit and credit cards differ. Adoption for debit cards by 
consumers may have reached a saturation point earlier than credit cards because they were 
adopted for their ATM functionality more than a decade before. In particular, the number of 
debit cards reached its peak in 2003 (33.1 million) and it has decreased since then to 31.5 million 
in 2007. However, the number of credit cards increased monotonically during the period, 
reaching 43 million in 2007. Spanish consumers increased their holdings of credit cards even 
when annual fees increased suggesting that the market for credit cards had not reached its 
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, we are not able to test the effects of the new regulatory framework because our sample period ends 
in 2007. Additionally, it is unclear to what extent the cost-based model will be finally used in the EU and, in 
particular since MasterCard –in order to avoid conflict with EU antitrust authorities- applied reduced cross-border 
interchange fee averages in March 2009 using a methodology along the lines of what Rochet and Tirole (2008) have 
called the “tourist test” interchange fee level. The “tourist test” or “avoided cost test” caps interchange fees at the 
level of transactional benefits of card payments for merchants (direct cost savings of card payments relative to non-
card payments). It therefore aims at internalizing usage externalities between the two sides by setting these fees at 
the level where merchants are on average indifferent between card and cash payments.   10
saturation point and consumers are willing to pay higher fees in exchange for greater merchant 
acceptance. 
Table 2 also shows that the average value of debit card transactions have increased 
significantly from 38.5 to 46 euros/transaction (in real terms) between 1997 and 2007. The 
increase in average real debit card per transaction value can be explained by the greater usage of 
these cards for payments of larger-value purchases at the POS.  On the other hand, the average 
credit card transaction value decreased from 58.5 to 54.3 euros (in real terms). The lower average 
real credit card per transaction value may result from the greater usage of these cards among 
consumers for lower-value purchases. The increase in credit card usage took place when credit 
card annual fees have been rising following the reduction of interchange fees. For example, 
according to the Bank of Spain, average credit card annual fees have increased from 21.35 euros 
in January 2005 to 28.43 euros in December 2007.  
 
4.  The Empirical Model 
Our objective is to empirically test whether the market-determined interchange fees prior 
to government intervention were socially optimal. For a set of interchange fees to be socially 
optimal, the sum of consumer and merchant utility along with bank profits must be equal or 
lower under a different set of interchange fees. Two-sided market theory suggests that a lower 
interchange fee is associated with a lower merchant fee and a higher cardholder fee. If merchants 
increase adoption of payment cards because of lower fees, we assume that they prefer to accept 
payment cards for at least certain types of transactions. Similarly, an increase or a relatively 
stable number of cards outstanding with higher fees suggests that consumers are willing to pay 
more to be able to use their cards at more merchants or that they are inelastic to price   11
movements. We will refer to the level of merchant and consumer adoption resulting from 
changes in the interchange fee as the merchant and consumer extensive margin, respectively. In 
addition to the extensive margin, we are able to study the impact of interchange fee reductions on 
usage or intensive margin of payment cards.  
We are able to study merchant and consumer extensive and intensive margins separately 
for debit and credit cards. There are some key differences in how banks charge consumers for 
their debit and credit cards. Consumers do not generally pay a fixed or per-transaction fee for 
their debit cards. The pricing for debit card services is often bundled with other banking services 
such as access to ATMs. Thus, to isolate a fee for debit card services separately is not possible. 
For our regression analysis, we use the density of rival ATMs as a proxy for the benefit of using 
debit cards. Given that ATM owners impose surcharges for cards issued by competitor banks, as 
the likelihood of using one of these ATMs increases, the benefit to having a debit card increases. 
In addition, there is the indirect network effect, namely as the number of merchants increase the 
value of the debit card increases. Thus, we would expect an increase in debit card issuance as the 
proportion of merchants that accept debit cards to increase. 
  The merchant extensive margin for debit cards is affected by the merchant fee to accept 
debit cards. We would expect greater merchant adoption as the acceptance fee decreases. In 
addition, there is the indirect network effect of greater number of cards in the network. We 
would expect a positive relationship between merchant adoption and number of cards in the 
network. 
Credit cards allow consumers to access lines of credit at their financial institutions when 
making payment. Unlike debit cards, consumers can use credit cards to make purchases even if 
they do not have funds in their bank accounts. Credit card services are stand alone products that   12
usually have explicit fees. Reductions in credit card interchange fee revenue should result in 
higher annual fee cardholders to offset lost issuer interchange revenue. If consumers do not give 
up their credit cards, we can conclude that either consumers are inelastic to changes in credit 
card fees or are willing to pay higher fees if they can use their cards at more merchant locations.   
Similar to debit cards, merchant adoption would be affected by the fee that they are 
charged and the number of credit cards in the network. We would expect as fees decrease and 
card adoption increases that merchant adoption would increase. 
 
Simultaneous equation setting, identification and exclusion restrictions 
  Given the two-sided nature of payment card markets, in our empirical specification, we 
simultaneously estimate the equations that identify the extensive (adoption) margins for 
merchants and consumers: 
Consumer extensive margin = f( Xcem ,C, R)     (2) 
Merchant extensive margin = f( Xmem ,C, R)     (3) 
where Xcem  and Xmem are the exclusion restrictions that identify the consumer extensive margin 
and the merchant extensive margin equations, respectively. Specifically, debit card exclusion 
restrictions for consumers are rival ATM density and merchant acceptance. For credit cards, the 
consumer exclusion restrictions are credit card annual fees and merchant acceptance. The 
merchant exclusion restrictions are similar for debit and credit cards. They are the respective 
merchant fees and the number of that type of card in the network. C and R are the vectors of 
control factors and regulatory dummies that are common to all the equations, respectively.   
Our control variables are bank size, the crime rate, and a time trend.  Given that payment 
processing is a scale business, we take bank size (in terms of the number of debit/credit   13
transactions over total transactions in the network where the bank operates) to control for any 
increase in bank size during the sample period. We use crime statistics to capture the effect of 
crime on the decisions of merchants and consumers to accept payment cards.
9 We would expect 
that as crime increases the adoption of payment cards to increase because payment cards are 
more secure than cash in the event they are stolen or misplaced. In order to control the (mainly 
upward) trend in the data for merchant acceptance, number of cards and number of transactions, 
we use a linear time trend.   
We also include four regulatory dummies to measure the impact of the different 
regulations and or agreements between the Spanish government and market participants on 
interchange fees. These regulatory dummies represent the year when the regulatory intervention 
was introduced or the implementation of agreements between market participants. The summary 
statistics for the variables that we use for our empirical model are shown in Table 4.  
  Merchant acceptance appears as the dependent variable in the merchant extensive margin 
equation and it enters the cardholder extensive margin as a lagged explanatory factor. The logic 
behind this specification is that merchant acceptance and fees may be contemporaneously related 
while transactions, issuance and usage may be determined by observed previous acceptance. 
However, consumers and merchants are not better off unless total card transactions 
increase. Many new payment technologies failed because one side adopted but the other side 
either did not adopt or failed to use these payment forms. We will refer to the change in usage 
from lower interchange fees as the intensive margin. We will also simultaneously estimate the 
equations that identify the intensive (usage) margins for consumers and merchants:  
Consumer intensive margin = f( Xcim ,C, R)     (4) 
                                                 
9 Some theoretical money models suggest that crime may be a reason to move away from cash (He, Huang, and 
Wright, 2005).     14
Merchant  intensive margin = f( Xmim ,C, R)     (5) 
where Xcim  and Xmim are the exclusion restrictions that identify the consumer intensive margin 
and the merchant intensive margin equations, respectively. The simultaneous estimation is 
undertaken for debit and credit cards separately. 
  For the merchant intensive margin, we use an acquirer’s quarterly transactions per POS 
terminal as our dependent variable. The exclusion restriction that identifies the merchant 
intensive margin is an interaction term of merchant acceptance by acquirer and the total number 
of cards in that network. The probability of a card transaction increases when the product of 
merchant acceptance by an acquirer and the number of total network cards increases.   
  In the cardholder intensive margin regression, we analyze what factors affect greater 
usage of payment cards by consumers. The dependent variable is the number of transactions per 
issuer per card. The key explanatory variable is an interaction term of the merchant acceptance in 
the network and the number of cards issued by the bank. We include the same control and 
regulatory dummies as in the other regressions. 
 
Instrumental Variables Approach 
Since our model specification allows adoption variables to interact with variables related 
to number of transactions this may create non-linear cross-equation restrictions on the specified 
parameters. In order to deal with these restrictions, the simultaneous equations are estimated 
using a General Method of Moments (GMM) routine with bank (acquirer and issuer specific) 
fixed effects. All variables (except for the regulatory dummies) are expressed as difference 
between the logarithms of current period and the period before so that these differences can be 
interpreted as growth rates. The GMM estimation relies on a set of orthogonality conditions   15
which are the products of equations and instruments. Initial conditions for estimation are 
obtained using three-stage least squares (3SLS), which is a restricted version of the simultaneous 
equation GMM model. Unlike the standard 3SLS, the GMM estimator allows for 
heteroskedasticity in addition to cross-equation correlation where some variables (as merchant 
acceptance in our case) may appear both as exogenous and (lagged) endogenous variables in the 
different equations (Hansen, 1982; Wooldrige, 2002).  
Our regression analysis may be subject to some endogeneity and autocorrelation issues. 
In order to control for endogeneity, lagged values of the explanatory variables in the different 
equations are employed as instruments. Focusing on the estimation of the set of equations, this 
treatment eliminates the most obvious source of endogeneity. The primary concern, however, is 
that some immeasurable aspect of the environment in which banks operate is associated with the 
acceptance, issuance or usage of cards. Therefore, we also use a simple time trend, up to two lags 
of GDP and population growth to control for those otherwise immeasurable aspects of the 
change in markets over time. A summary of the exclusions restrictions, instruments and control 
factors in each one of the estimated equations is shown in Table 5. The Sargan or J test of 
overidentifying restrictions is also computed in order to examine the identification of the model 
with the selected set of instruments under the null hypothesis of correct identifying restrictions. 
As for potential autocorrelation problems, we also include AR(1) and AR(2) tests of first- and 
second-order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively, which are asymptotically distributed as a 
standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
 
Identifying issuer and acquirer revenues   16
  Unfortunately, we are unable to measure bank profits directly, but we are able to study 
the impact on bank revenue. If costs remain constant or grow slower than revenues, bank profits 
would be increasing with increasing revenue. Given large economies of scale and scope, one 
might expect that costs would not grow as fast as revenues. 
We separate banks into issuers and acquirers for debit and credit cards. Our dependent 
variables are issuer and acquirer payment card revenue by type of card. For issuers, this would be 
the product of the average interchange fees and the number of transactions and total annual fees 
collected (only for credit cards). For acquirers, this would be the difference between the 
merchant discount charged and the interchange fee paid multiplied by the number of 
transactions. Similar to consumer and merchant intensive margin, our explanatory variable for 
acquirers is one-quarter lag of the interaction of merchant acceptance of a specific acquirer and 
the total number of cards in the network. Our explanatory variable for the issuers is the number 
of cards issued by each issuer the quarter before times the proportion of merchants accepting in 
the whole network. We also include a linear time trend, the crime rate, the rivals’ ATM density 
and bank size as control variables. In addition, we have our regulatory dummies.   
 
5.  Our Dataset 
Unlike consumer and merchant survey data, we use bank-level administrative data that is 
less likely to be associated with measurement error. For consumers, we rely on issuer 
transactional and card adoption data to analyze changes in explanatory variables.  For merchants, 
we rely on acquirer adoption and transactional data to analyze changes in explanatory variables.   
We use quarterly payment card data from 45 Spanish banks from 1997:1 to 2007:4. 
These data are adjusted to reflect mergers over the period to create a balanced panel by backward   17
aggregating all premerger data on merging banks prior to their merger. In total, there are 1,980 
panel observations.
10 The database contains quarterly bank-level information on payment cards, 
ATMs, POS terminals and related transactions volumes and values as well as prices for debit 
(interchange and merchant fees) and credit card transactions (interchange fees, merchant fees and 
annual credit card fees). It also contains time-series data on merchant acceptance for debit and 
credit cards.  
Since most of the banks in the sample operate in different regions, the variable for 
merchant acceptance by acquirer has been computed as an (branch weighted) average of 
merchant acceptance in the different regions where the (acquirer) bank operates. Similarly, the 
variable for merchant acceptance at the network level has been computed as a branch-weighted 
average of the percentage of merchants accepting cards for purchase transactions in the regions 
where the bank or any other banks belonging to the same network operate over the total number 
of merchants in those regions.  
Additionally, although the maximum and minimum thresholds of interchange fees for 
different merchant activities is set at the network level, the average bank-level merchant fee 
varies depending on the actual fee charged and the proportion of the bank’s POS debit and credit 
transactions by merchant sector. Therefore, the merchant discount fee charged by a bank is 
computed as a transaction weighted-average of merchant discount fees charged by the bank in 
the different merchant sectors accepting the bank’s POS machines.  
We also incorporate the availability of cash infrastructure such as ATMs into our 
analysis. Our data also includes information on ATM density and allows us to compute a rival 
ATM density variable as a proxy of the relative costs of withdrawing cash at rivals’ ATMs. 
                                                 
10 Our sample banks represented 56.7% of total card payment transactions in 1997 and 64.8% in 2007 when 
compared to the aggregate date provided by the Bank of Spain.   18
Some other variables are considered in the database as region-specific control variables that may 
have an influence on card transactions such as the crime rate. We also control for the four main 
regulatory changes shown in Table 2 including dummies for those regulatory changes. Table 3 
provides the main definitions of the posited explanatory variables. 
  Our crime data is region specific and measures robberies and assaults per 1,000 residents 
in a given region. If the bank operates in more than one region, we use a weighted average by the 
number of bank branches in the region.   
 
6.  Main Results 
  In tables 6-10, we report our regression results. Generally, we find that consumers and 
merchants benefit from lower in interchange fees during our sample period because an increase 
in merchant card acceptance results in greater adoption and usage of payment cards. 
Furthermore, we find that issuer and acquirer revenues increased because lower interchange fees 
resulted in more transactions. The revenue from increased transactions offsets the decrease in 
per-transaction revenue for issuers during our sample period. For acquirers, the percentage 
difference between the merchant discount and the interchange fee remained steady for a 
significant part of our sample. We will first discuss debit card extensive and intensive margins 
and then discuss our credit card results.   
 
Debit Card Adoption and Usage 
Our empirical analysis strongly suggests that government mandated or encouraged 
reductions in interchange fees resulted in lower merchant debit card fees and greater merchant 
debit card acceptance (see table 6). Specifically, a 10 percent reduction in the rate of decline in   19
the average merchant discount fee by an acquirer resulted in a .43 percent rate of increase in 
merchant acceptance. Neither bank size nor crime is statistically significant. 
  The signs of all the regulatory dummies except for 1999 suggest that lower interchange 
fees strongly impacted the rate of merchant acceptance. However, the impact of each 
intervention was different suggesting that not all interventions were equal in convincing 
merchants to adopt debit cards. Furthermore, the consistent positive sign on the last three 
regulatory dummies suggests that merchant acceptance increased with further reductions in 
interchange fees. Note that in 2005, there was a change in the way debit card interchange fee was 
imposed from a transaction percentage to a fixed per-transaction fee. 
  While we are unable to isolate a price effect for consumer adoption debit card services, 
we find strong evidence to support our hypothesis that consumers value greater merchant 
acceptance and react to increases in the price of the main alternative payment instrument—cash. 
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the rate of merchant adoption resulted in a .36 percent 
increase in adoption rate of debit cards by consumers. As the rival ATM density increases, 
consumer adoption of debit cards increases suggesting that increases in cash acquisition costs 
impacts positively on debit card adoption. Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the rate of 
growth of rival ATM density resulted in a 1.64 percent increase in the growth rate of debit card 
adoption.  
  Now, we turn to the intensive margin for debit cards (see table 7). First, let’s consider the 
impact of interchange fee regulation on merchant transactional volume from looking at acquirer 
transactional volume per POS terminal as the dependent variable (table 6, column2). The 
interaction of merchant acceptance at an acquirer and the total number of cards is significant and 
positive suggesting that the rate of growth of debit card transactions has increased because there   20
are more merchants and consumers on board because of lower interchange fees. Specifically, a 
10 percent increase in the growth rate of merchant adoption resulted in a debit card transaction 
growth of .36 percent.  
All the regulatory dummies are positive and significant suggesting that regulatory 
intervention increased overall usage at merchant locations. The rate of transaction growth is 
highest for the period after 2005 suggesting that the later regulatory interventions had more 
impact on transactional volume at acquirers.   
The increase in issuer transactions proxies for the increase in consumer usage albeit 
imperfectly. The key explanatory variable is the interaction of merchant acceptance and cards 
issued by a bank. The interaction term is significant and positive suggesting that an increase in 
consumer and merchant adoption growth rates increases the rate of growth for consumer 
transactions (table 7, column 3). Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the rate of the interaction 
of network merchant acceptance and debit cards issued by an issuer resulted in a .46 percent 
increase in an issuer’s debit card transactions per card. Furthermore, a 10 percent increase in the 
growth of rival ATM density resulted in a .63 percent increase in the rate of issuer debit card 
transactions per card. In other words, in a cash-intensive country such as Spain, an increase in 
cash acquisition costs strongly encourages adoption of debit cards.  
All the regulatory dummies are positive and significant suggesting that decreases in debit 
card interchange fees increased debit card transactions for issuers. As before, the later regulatory 
actions impact issuer transaction volume growth more. Specifically, the issuer transactional 
growth rate for 1999 dummy is .096 percent whereas the growth rate for the 2005 dummy is .233 
percent.    21
Both the extensive and intensive debit card margin regressions suggest that consumer and 
merchant welfare improved when interchange fees were reduced. Not only are transactions 
occurring at more merchant locations, but each cardholder is using her card more frequently.   
 
Credit Card Adoption and Usage 
The underlying dynamics of credit card adoption is significantly different from debit card 
adoption where consumers had them in their wallets before they started to use them because 
debit cards also functioned as ATM cards. Reductions in credit card merchant discount fees 
increased merchant acceptance of credit cards (see table 8). Specifically, a 10 percent increase in 
the rate of decline of the average merchant discount of an acquirer increased the growth rate of 
merchant acceptance by 1.59 percent. A 10 percent growth in credit card adoption resulted in a 
1.63 percent growth in the acceptance of credit cards by merchants. Note that only the last two 
regulatory dummies are significant suggesting that the initial regulatory interventions were not as 
effective in increasing merchant acceptance as the last two.   
As our priors suggested, the number of cards issued by an issuer is positively impacted by 
the number of merchants that accept credit cards (table 8, column 3).  Specifically, a 10 percent 
increase in the growth rate in merchant acceptance increases the growth of credit card issuance 
by 3.0 percent. 
A key result is that growth in the number of cards issued is not affected by the annual fee 
suggesting that the interchange fee was not previously socially optimal. We are unable to 
disentangle two potential reasons for this insignificance. First, consumers may be fairly inelastic 
to increases to credit card annual fees. Second, they are willing to pay higher fees if more 
merchants accept credit cards. Regardless of why consumers do not respond to prices, there may   22
be benefits to increasing merchants that accept credit cards by imposing higher costs on 
consumers.  These benefits stem from the network externality of merchant acceptance. 
We report credit card merchant and consumer intensive margins in table 9. A 10 percent 
increase in the growth of the interaction term of acceptance by merchants using the same 
acquirer and total credit cards in the network results in a 2.44 percent increase in the growth of 
acquirer transactions at the point of sale (table 9, column2).  Interestingly, the crime rate is also 
positive and statistically significant. One cautious interpretation would be that credit cards unlike 
debit cards are used for large purchases and merchants are more willing to accept them because 
carrying large amounts of cash is undesirable in high crime areas. The regulatory dummies when 
significant have positive signs. 
We report the consumer intensive margin in table 9, column 3. We find that a 10 percent 
increase in the growth rate of the interaction term of merchant acceptance in the network and 
credit cards issued by an issuer results in a 1.93 percent increase in issuer transaction volume. 
The coefficient on the crime rate also is significant and positive suggesting that higher crime 
rates induce shift from cash to credit cards, which are generally used for higher-value purchases. 
Similarly, all the regulatory dummies are significant and positive.  
Mandatory reductions in credit card interchange fees have improved consumer and 
merchant welfare as evidenced by greater adoption and usage. We analyze the impact of 
interchange fee regulation on bank revenues in the next section.  
 
Bank revenues 
  In table 10, we report our results for bank revenues. In the second and third columns, we 
report debit card acquiring revenue and debit card issuing revenue regression results,   23
respectively. In the fourth and fifth columns, we report credit card acquiring and credit card 
issuing revenue regression results, respectively. In both sets of regressions, the increase in the 
number of transactions is positively correlated with bank revenues suggesting that while per-
transaction revenue may have decreased, overall revenues increased because the revenue from 
increased transactions volume offset the decrease in per-transaction revenue for the time period 
of our sample.   
However, the impact of regulatory dummies is more significant on the issuing side than 
the acquiring side as also evidenced by the goodness of fit. This result is consistent with the fact 
that the acquiring side of the business may be more competitive and any reductions in 
interchange fees would result in an equal magnitude decrease in the merchant discount. We 
reported earlier that the correlation between the movements in merchant discounts and the 
interchange fees are close to one. On the issuing side, the reduction in interchange fees is 
positively and significantly related to bank revenues suggesting that competition may have been 
too intense on the issuing side resulting in “too high” merchant discount and interchange fees. In 
turn, fewer card transactions took place at this socially inferior interchange fee.  
We present our bank revenue results somewhat cautiously because we are unable to 
consider additional costs that may have been incurred putting downward pressure on profits. Bolt 
and Chakravorti (2008a) develop a model that finds lower bounds for merchant fees and 
implicitly interchange fees based on underlying cost structures. A more complete analysis would 
consider bank payment card profits instead of revenues.  Unfortunately, our dataset does not 
allow such analysis.   
  
7.  Robustness tests   24
  In this section, we conduct several robustness tests to consider alternate explanations for 
increased adoption and usage of payment cards. 
 
Other Simultaneous Equation Specifications 
  We have tried other specifications for the simultaneous equations estimations. In 
particular, we estimated the system using two-stage-least squares, three-stage least squares and 
seemingly-unrelated regressions. Although the results were overall qualitatively similar, the 
goodness of fit of these estimations was far poorer than our GMM estimations.   
  In the GMM baseline results, autocorrelation tests are included to examine the possibility 
that lagged values of the dependent variables might affect, at least partially, the current values of 
these variables.  In this case, a “dynamic” speciﬁcation with lagged dependent variables as 
regressors could address these feedback effects.  However, the values of these tests in all our 
regressions suggest that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected and, 
therefore, do not warrant using dynamic specification. In any event, regressions using dynamic 
panel techniques were also undertaken and the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables 
were not found to be significant in any of the equations.  
 
Variations in regulatory dummy specification 
  As for our stepwise dummies showing the effects of changes in interchange fee 
regulation, various alternatives were considered.  The dummies were introduced one by one in 
the equations and the results were very similar to those obtained when they are included 
altogether.     25
Additionally, to identify the regulatory changes, a potential disadvantage of the dummies 
is that they are a stepwise and discontinuous approximation of the regulatory effect across time.  
Linear splines give a more precise approximation of the effect of interchange fee regulations as a 
set of continuous linear functions. Therefore, as a robustness check, we reran our regressions 
with splines instead of dummies. We approximate the splines as the difference in the number of 
quarters between four subintervals (the regulatory events). The end points of the linearly 
approximated subintervals are known as “knots” and the specification of the spline is 
11 1 1 () [ ( ) / ( ) ] [ ( ) / ( ) ] ii i i i i i i f xx x x x x x x x α α ++ + + =−− + − −  when  1 (, ) ii x xx + ∈  and 0 otherwise, 
where x is the quarter considered, and xi are the “knots.”  The use of splines did not change our 
results with all the coefficients for the regulatory events maintaining their signs and no 
statistically significant differences with the estimated values of the coefficients from the 
dummies in our baseline results.  
 
Estimations for different sub-periods and related regulatory effects 
  A simpler (although less informative) approach to likely changes in merchants and 
consumers’ intensive and extensive margins is estimating our main equations for four different 
time periods (1997-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2007). Table 11 (panels A to D) show 
the results for this alternative specification. As for merchant adoption of debit and credit cards 
(Table 11, panels A and B), the effects of changes in debit merchant discount fees on merchant 
adoption and of merchant acceptance in the network on the number of debit cards are from 1 to 3 
times higher in the 1999-2001 and 2005-2007 periods than in the other two periods. These 
differences are statistically significant according to Wald tests of differences in the estimated 
coefficients and suggest that the dynamics of prices and adoption and usage particularly   26
increased in the periods where interchange fees were reduced to a larger extent due to mandated 
or encouraged government intervention. In the case of credit cards, related differences in the 
magnitude of the coefficients for the abovementioned sub-periods are a bit lower (from 1 to 1.5 
times higher) although also statistically significant according to Wald tests (not shown for 
simplicity). 
 
Alternative control variables 
  The results also seemed robust to alternative specifications of the control variables and, in 
particular, the time trend. A potential weakness of the proposed specification is that the trend is 
not appropriately capturing over time changes that may overlap with the identified impact of 
regulatory dummies. In particular, factor such as non linear trends, business cycle influences or 
technological changes may affect our results. In order to control for these potential influences we 
have also tried other types of variables to pick them up such as a quadratic time trend, GDP 
growth and Internet penetration. It may also be the case that the dynamics of intensive and 
extensive margins may be different in territories with different levels of card usage due to 
idiosyncratic features such as differences in the presence of tourists that may make adoption and 
usage potentially heterogeneous across regions, thereby affecting to a larger extent those banks, 
merchants and consumers in more touristic regions. We have considered these influences by 
estimating our main equations for two sub-samples separating regions over the median value of 
tourism revenues over GDP and below that median value. The results for all these alternative 
specifications are shown in Table 12 (panels A to D) and suggest that none of these alternative 
specifications significantly change our baseline results and conclusions since our main variables 
exhibit the same signs and similar coefficient magnitudes.    27
 
8.  Conclusion 
The structure of fees in two-sided markets has been addressed in the theoretical literature 
but there has been little empirical analysis regarding the impact of changes to fee structures. 
Theory predicts that platforms in two-sided markets may subsidize the participation of one set of 
agents by extracting surplus from another set of agents to internalize indirect network 
externalities. We find evidence that reducing interchange fees have a positive effect on consumer 
and merchant adoption and usage when merchant adoption is far from complete.  
While we are unable to study the impact of interchange fee regulation on bank profits, we 
find that bank revenues increased because the increase in the number of transactions offset the 
decrease in the per-transaction revenue. However, there is most likely a critical interchange fee 
below which revenues no longer increase. Unfortunately, given our data limitations, we are 
unable to quantify the critical interchange fee.  
Interestingly, other market-based solutions may result in maximizing social welfare such 
as price discrimination based on the benefits received by each merchant and each consumer. For 
example, in other countries such as the United States, interchange fees for new entrants such as 
grocery stores in the 1990s were reduced significantly by payment card networks to encourage 
merchant acceptance of payment cards without government encouragement. Such market-based 
strategies also internalize the merchant adoption externality. Thus, our results should not be 
viewed as a blanket endorsement for government-encouraged interchange fee reductions.   
  Once merchant and consumer adoption is complete, interchange fee regulation may only 
result in redistribution of surplus among participants, most notably between banks and 
merchants. In other words, interchange fee regulation would not necessarily improve social   28
welfare. In this case, we are agnostic about the distribution of surplus among payment card 
market participants.  
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Table 1: Regulatory Actions Affecting the Setting of Interchange Fees   
Year  Regulatory action  Regulatory body  Main implications for interchange 
fees 
1999  REDUCTION OF INTERCHANGE FEES  THE SPANISH MINISTRY 
OF THE ECONOMY 
Interchange fees were gradually reduced 
from around 3.5% in 1999 to 2.75% in July 
2002. 
2002 
INVESTIGATION ON THE SETTING OF 
INTERCHANGE FEES (MORAL SUASION) 
SPAIN’S ANTITRUST 
AUTHORITY 
Following the investigations of the 
European Commission on cross-border 
interchange fees, the Spain’s Antitrust 
Authority (the TDC) requested the Spanish 
payment card networks to provide 
information on their method of determining 
interchange fee. 
2003 
PROPOSALS FROM THE NETWORKS ON 
THE SETTING OF INTERCHANGE FEES 
ARE REFUSED (MORAL SUASION) 
SPAIN’S ANTITRUST 
AUTHORITY 
The TDC refused several proposals of the 
networks on their setting of interchange 
fees. 
2005 
A REDUCTION OF INTERCHANGE FEES 
AND A FINAL DATE FOR THE ADOPTION 
OF A COST-BASED MODEL 
THE SPANISH MINISTRY 
OF INDUSTRY, TOURISM 
AND TRADE 
From January 2006 until December 2008, 
the maximum level for an interchange fee 
would be progressively reduced. From 2009 
onwards each of the card networks would 
audit their operations and provide a cost-
based analysis for debit and credit cards. 
Source: Summary of regulatory developments mainly based on the following resolutions: Spanish Antitrust 
Authority (Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia, TDC) resolution on the reduction of interchange fees (24 
September 1999), Resolution of the European Commission (DG Competition COMP/29373) on the setting of cross-
border interchange fees by Visa International (July 24, 2002), TDC inquiries on the setting of interchange fees by 
the card networks SISTEMA 4B (inquiry A 314/2002) and SERVIRED (inquiry 318/2002). TDC resolution denying 
the special authorizations on the setting of interchange fees to all Spanish card networks and requiring them to 
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Table 2: Recent Trends in Card Payments in Spain (1997-2007) 
All the monetary magnitudes are expressed in real terms 
  1997 2007 
Total Number of Debit Cards (millions)  22  31 
Total Number of Credit Cards (millions)  14  43 
Total Number of Debit Card Transactions (millions)  156  863 
Total Number of Credit Card Transactions (millions)  138  1037 
Average number of POS transactions (per card and year)  7.1  27.8 
Average number of ATM withdrawals (per card and year)  23.9  32.6 
Average Value of Debt Card Transaction (€)  38.5  46.0 
Average Value of Credit Card Transaction (€)  58.5  54.3 
Average POS density (POS/km
2) 1.28  2.89 
Average ATM density (ATMs/km
2) 0.07  0.12 
Average Interchange Fee 
(*) (%)  1.71
(a)  0.90 
Average Debit Card Interchange Fee
(**)(€/transaction)  - 0.40 
Average Credit Card Interchange Fee
(**)(%)  - 0.93 
(a) Data for 2002, the earliest public data available for the average interchange fees for the 
entire Spanish market. 
(*) Average percentage value of total debit and credit, on-us and intersystem interchange 
fees.  
(**) As a consequence of the intervention of the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism 
and Trade in 2005, a distinction is made between the applicable debit card interchange 
fees and credit card interchange fees, with debit card transactions becoming a fixed 
amount per transaction and credit card transactions continuing to be a percentage amount 
per transaction. 
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Table 3: Variable Definitions 
Debit card merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit)  Computed as (branch-weighted) average of the percentage of merchants accepting debit cards for 
purchase transactions in the regions where the bank operates over the total number of merchants in those 
regions. 
Credit card merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCCit)  Computed as (branch-weighted) average of the percentage of merchants accepting credit cards for 
purchase transactions in the regions where the bank operates over the total number of merchants in those 
regions. 
Debit card merchant acceptance in the network 
(MACCDNt) 
The percentage of merchants accepting debit cards where the network operates. 
Credit card merchant acceptance in the network 
(MACCCNt) 
The percentage of merchants accepting credit cards where the network operates. 
Merchant debit card discount fee (MFEEDit)   Average (transaction-weighted) debit card merchant discount fee charged by the bank computed as the 
(transaction-weighted) average discount fee charged to the merchants accepting the bank POS device.  
Merchant credit card discount fee (MFEECit)   Average (transaction-weighted) credit card merchant discount fee charged by the bank computed as the 
(transaction-weighted) average discount fee charged to the merchants accepting the bank POS device.  
Number of debit cards by issuer (DCARDSit)  Total number of debit cards issued by a bank.  
Number of credit cards by issuer (CCARDSit)  Total number of credit cards issued by a bank.  
Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt)  Total number of debit cards issued by the network.  
Number of credit cards in the network (CCARDSNt)  Total number of credit cards issued by the network.  
Debit card transactions at the POS (DEBPOSTRit)  Debit card transactions per POS terminal by an acquirer. 
Credit card transactions at the POS (CREDPOSTRit)  Credit card transactions per POS terminal by an acquirer. 
Debit card transactions (issuer perspective) (DEBISSit)  Debit card transactions per card by issuer. 
Credit card transactions (issuer perspective) (CREDISSit)  Credit card transactions (month-end/no interest)  per card by issuer. 
Rival ATM density (RATMDit)  Number of an issuer’s rival bank ATMs per km
2 in the regions where the bank operates.  
Annual credit card fee (AFEECREDit)  Average (asset-weighted) annual credit card fee changed by the bank.  
Bank size (in the card network) (BSIZEit)  Number of bank card transactions over the total number of card transactions in the network in which the 
bank operates. 
Crime rate (CRIMEit)  The (asset-weighted) ratio of robbery & assaults per 1000 inhabitants in the regions where the acquirer or 
issuer operates.  
Bank (debit card) acquiring revenues (BANKDACR)  Acquirer income from debit card merchant discount fees 
Bank (debit card) issuing revenues (BANKDISR)  Issuer income from debit card interchange fees 
Bank (credit card) acquiring revenues (BANKCACR)  Acquirer income from credit card merchant discount fees 
Bank (credit card) issuing revenues (BANKCISR)  Issuer income from credit card interchange fees and credit card annual fees 
Regulation dummy 1999 (REG99)  This variable takes the value 1 during the time that the level of interchange fees were reduced by 
regulation from 1999 to 2002 and zero otherwise. 
Regulation dummy 2002 (REG02)  This variable takes the value 1 from 2002 to 2003 and zero otherwise and controls for changes related to 
the moral suasion pressures following the investigation by the Spanish antitrust authority on the collective 
setting of interchange fees.  
Regulation dummy 2003 (REG03)  This variable takes the value 1 from 2003 to 2005 and zero otherwise and controls for the increasing 
pressures and moral suasion on the setting or interchange and the refusal of the proposals for special 
authorization of collective determination of these fees by the card networks.  
Regulation dummy 2005 (REG05)  This variable takes the value 1 from 2005 onwards and zero otherwise and controls for changes related to 
a regulatory initiative on the reduction of interchange fees and the requirement of adoption of a cost-
based model for interchange fee setting. 
GDP growth  Computed as (branch-weighted) average of the growth of regional domestic product in the regions where 
each bank operates. 
Internet penetration rate  Computed as (branch-weighted) average yearly increase of Internet users in the Spanish regions 
according to the Survey on Household Technology Adoption elaborated by INE. 
SOURCES: All variables related to card payments have been provided by a payment network of 45 Spanish banks. The crime rate variables have been obtained from the 
Spain’s Statistical Office (INE). 
EXPLANATORY NOTES: 
-  All monetary magnitudes are expressed in real terms. 
-  All variables (except for regulatory dummies are in logarithms) 
 Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
Debit card merchant acceptance by acquirer in regions where 
it has branches (MACCDit) (%)  55.36 2.16 51.15  59.36 
Credit card merchant acceptance by acquirer in regions where 
it has branches (MACCCit) (%)  57.23 1.97 52.12  61.06 
Debit card merchant acceptance in the network (MACCDNt) 
(%)  58.02 2.02 53.60  61.94 
Credit card merchant acceptance in the network (MACCCNt) 
(%)  59.37 1.92 53.51  62.49 
Merchant debit card discount fee by acquirer (MFEEDit)  (%)  1.36  1.18  0.36  3.18 
Merchant credit card discount fee by acquirer (MFEECit)  (%)  2.03  1.93  1.06  3.56 
Number of debit cards by issuer (DCARDSit) (millions)  0.48  0.72  0.02  4.2 
Number of credit cards by issuer (CCARDSit) (millions)  0.55  0.94  0.01  4.9 
Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt) (millions)  16  5.8  12  21 
Number of credit cards in the network (CCARDSNt) (millions)  20  6.3  10  32 
Debit card transactions at the POS by acquirer (DEBPOSTRit) 
(millions)  11.14 34.18  0.11 88.1 
Credit card transactions at the POS by acquirer 
(CREDPOSTRit) (millions)  12.28 56.26  0.09 94.7 
Debit card transactions by issuer (DEBISSit) (%)  1.21  4.16  0.04  10.27 
Credit card transactions by issuer (CREDISSit) (%)  1.60  5.21  0.02  12.56 
Rival ATM density by issuer (RATMDit) (ATMs/km
2) 0.9  0.4  0.3  1.5 
Annual credit card fee by issuer (AFEECREDit) (euros)  15  10  3  35 
Bank size (in the card network) (BSIZEit) (%)  1.16  4.02  0.01  11.28 
Crime rate (CRIMEit) 0.37  0.21  0.10  0.68 
Bank (debit card) acquiring revenues (BANKDACR) (€ 
millions)  4.31 2.19 0.08  45.23 
Bank (debit card) issuing revenues (BANKDISR) (€ millions)  25.43  13.84  0.32  114.15 
Bank (credit card) acquiring revenues (BANKCACR) (€ 
millions)  6.17 3.12 0.11  54.89 
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Table 5: Identification of the equations: exclusion restrictions, instruments and 
control factors 
 
Equation  Exclusion 
restrictions  Instruments  Control 
factors  
Consumer extensive 
margin (debit cards) 
- Rival ATM density 
- Merchant acceptance 
- Lagged rival ATM density  
- Lagged merchant acceptance 
- Lagged (GDP) 



















- Bank size 
 





margin (credit cards) 
- Annual fees 
- Merchant acceptance 
- Lagged annual fees 
- Lagged merchant acceptance 
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Merchant extensive 
margin (debit cards) 
- Debit card merchant 
fees 
- Number of debit cards 
in the network 
- Lagged (debit cards merchant fees) 
- Lagged (number of debit cards in the 
network) 
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Merchant extensive 
margin (credit cards) 
- Credit card merchant 
fees 
- Number of credit 
cards in the network 
- Lagged (credit card merchant fees) 
- Lagged (number of credit cards in the 
network) 
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Consumer intensive 
margin (debit cards) 
- (Merchant acceptance  
of debit cards by 
acquirer) x (total 
number of debit cards 
in that network) 
- Lagged (merchant acceptance  of debit 
cards by acquirer) x (total number of 
debit cards in that network) 
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Merchant intensive 
margin (debit cards) 
- (Merchant acceptance 
of debit cards in the 
network) x (number of 
debit cards issued by 
the bank) 
- Lagged (merchant acceptance of debit 
cards in the network) x (number of debit 
cards issued by the bank) 
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Consumer intensive 
margin (credit cards) 
- (Merchant acceptance 
of credit cards by 
acquirer) x (total 
number of credit cards 
in that network) 
- Lagged (merchant acceptance of credit 
cards by acquirer) x (total number of 
credit cards in that network) 
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Merchant intensive 
margin (credit cards) 
- (Merchant acceptance  
of credit cards in the 
network) x (number of 
credit cards issued by 
the bank) 
- Lagged (merchant acceptance  of credit 
cards in the network) x (number of credit 
cards issued by the bank) 
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Acquirer revenues   - (Merchant acceptance 
of the acquirer) x (total 
number of cards in the 
network)   
- Lagged (merchant acceptance of the 
acquirer) x (total number of cards in the 
network)   
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth) 
Issuer revenues  - (Number of cards 
issued by each issuer)  
x  (proportion of 
merchants accepting in 
the network)   
- Lagged (number of cards issued by 
each issuer)  x  (proportion of merchants 
accepting in the network)   
- Lagged (GDP) 
- Lagged (population growth)   37
Table 6: Debit Card Extensive Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
  Merchant extensive 
margin (debit cards) 
Consumer extensive 
margin (debit cards) 
Merchant acceptance by 
acquirer(MACCDit) 
Number of debit cards by 
issuer (DCARDSit) 




Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCDNt-1)  - 0.0363** 
(0.012) 
Merchant debit card discount fee (MFEEDit)   -0.0429** 
(0.005) 
- 
Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt)  0.0015** 
(0.002) 
- 
Rival ATM density (RATMDit)  - .1637** 
(0.014) 





























2 0.82  0.71 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions  
(p-value in parentheses) 
68.58  
(0.005) 
AR(1) (p-value in parentheses)  -0.1009 
(0.920) 
AR(2) (p-value in parentheses)  −1.237 
(0.216) 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 7: Debit Card Intensive Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 



















Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X Number 




Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCDNt-1)X 
Number of debit cards by issuer (DCARDSit-1) 
- 0.0458** 
(0.009) 
Rival ATM density (RATMDit)  - 0.0630* 
(0.018) 





























2 0.89  0.71 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions  
(p-value in parentheses) 
154.29 
(0.001) 
AR(1) (p-value in parentheses)  −1.528 
(0.129) 
AR(2) (p-value in parentheses)  −1.416 
(0.136) 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
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Table 8: Credit Card Extensive Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
  Merchant extensive margin 
(credit cards) 
Consumer extensive margin 
(credit cards) 
Merchant acceptance by 
acquirer (MACCCit) 
Number of credit cards by 
issuer (CCARDSit) 




Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCCNt-1)  - 0.2985** 
(0.007) 
Merchant credit card discount fee (MFEECit)   -0.1585** 
(0.023) 
- 
Number of credit cards in the network (CCARDSNt)  0.1630** 
(0.018) 
- 
Annual credit card fee (AFEECREDit)  - 0.6023 
(0.730) 





























2 0.87  0.93 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions  
(p-value in parentheses) 
152.28  
(0.001) 
AR(1) (p-value in parentheses)  -1.198 
(0.231) 
AR(2) (p-value in parentheses)  −1.677 
(0.094) 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 9: Credit Card Intensive Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
  Merchant intensive 
margin (credit cards) 
Consumer intensive 
margin (credit cards) 
Credit card 




transactions per card 
(issuer perspective) 
(CREDISSit) 




Merchant acceptance by acquirer(MACCCit-1)X Number of 




Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCCNt-1)X Number 
of credit cards by issuer (CCARDSit-1) 
- 0.1931** 
(0.002) 





























2 0.68  0.95 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions  
(p-value in parentheses) 
66.34 
(0.02) 
AR(1) (p-value in parentheses)  −0.6453 
(0.421) 
AR(2) (p-value in parentheses)  −1.176 
(0.192) 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
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Table 10: Impact on Bank Issuing and Acquiring Revenues  
Simultaneous Equations Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 


























Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1) X 
Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt-1) 
0.0362* 
(0.014) 
- -  - 
Number of debit cards by issuer (DCARDSit-1) X 




Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCCit-1) X 
Number of credit cards in the network (DCARDSNt-1) 
- -  0.0838** 
(0.008) 
- 
Number of credit cards by issuer (DCARDSit-1) X 
Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCDNt-1) 
- - -  0.1743** 
(0.005) 






























































2 0.42  0.88  0.44  0.89 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions  













* Statistically significant at 5% level 
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Table 11 (Panel A): Estimations for different sub-periods: Debit Card Extensive 
Margins for Consumers and Merchants Simultaneous Equation estimation (GMM 
with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
































































































Number of debit 













2  0.62  0.59  0.67 0.62 0.61  0.66  0.64  0.69 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown for simplicity. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 11 (Panel B): Estimations for different sub-periods: Debit Card Intensive 
Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 




















































































































2 0.72 0.65 0.75 0.66 0.71 0.62 0.76 0.67 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown for simplicity. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 11 (Panel C): Estimations for different sub-periods: Credit Card Extensive 
Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
  1997-1998 1999-2001  2002-2004  2005-2007 








































































Merchant acceptance in 









Merchant credit card 










Number of credit cards in 











2 0.75  0.84  0.76  0.80  0.79  0.83  0.78  0.82 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 































Table 11 (Panel D): Estimations for different sub-periods: Credit Card Intensive 
Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
 
1997-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 
















































































Number of credit 













acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCCNt-1)X 
Number of credit 











2  0.54 0.83 0.60 0.88 0.59 0.84 0.61 0.87 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown for simplicity. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 














Table 12 (Panel A): Alternative control variables and sub-samples: Debit Card Extensive Margins for Consumers and 
Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 












































Number of debit 















debit cards by 
issuer 
(DCARDSit) 






























- -  - -  -  - 




- -  -  - 






2  0.82 0.70 0.80  0.69  0.81  0.73 0.82 0.74 
Subsample of banks operating in most touristic areas  Subsample of banks operating in less touristic areas 
Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X 
Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt-1)  
- 0.0316** 
(0.009) 
Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X Number of debit cards 
in the network (DCARDSNt-1)  
- 0.0335** 
(0.009) 
Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X 
Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt-1)  
-0.0411** 
(0.004) 
-  Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X Number of debit cards 




Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt)  0.0014** 
(0.002) 




2  0.80 0.71  Adjusted R
2  0.85 0.76 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown for simplicity. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 12 (Panel B): Alternative control variables and sub-samples: Debit Card Intensive Margins for Consumers and 
Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 


















































































Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X 










Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCDNt-1)X 













- - - - -  - 




- - -  - 






2  0.87 0.71 0.89 0.72 0.87 0.70 0.84  0.63 
Subsample of banks operating in most touristic areas Subsample of banks operating in less touristic areas
Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X 
Number of debit cards in the network (DCARDSNt-1) 
0.0343** 
(0.004) 
-  Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCDit-1)X 




Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCDNt-1)X 
Number of debit cards by issuer (DCARDSit-1) 
- 0.0429** 
(0.009) 
Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCDNt-1)X 




2  0.79 0.61  Adjusted R
2  0.81 0.63 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown for simplicity. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 12 (Panel C): Alternative control variables and sub-samples: Credit Card Extensive Margins for Consumers and 
Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 









margin (credit cards) 
Merchant extensive 
















Number of credit 






Number of credit 












































































- -  -  -  -  - 




- -  -  - 






2 0.85  0.92  0.85  0.90  0.85  0.92  0.80  0.84 
Subsample of banks operating in most touristic areas Subsample of banks operating in less touristic areas
Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCCNt-1)  - 0.2431** 
(0.007) 
Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCCNt-1)  - 0.2789** 
(0.007) 
Merchant credit card discount fee (MFEECit)   -0.1465** 
(0.022) 
-  Merchant credit card discount fee (MFEECit)   -0.1453** 
(0.025) 
- 
Number of credit cards in the network (CCARDSNt)  0.1619** 
(0.017) 
-  Number of credit cards in the network (CCARDSNt)  0.1638** 
(0.014) 
- 
Annual credit card fee (AFEECREDit)  - 0.5683 
(0.659) 
Annual credit card fee (AFEECREDit)  - 0.6215 
(0.659) 
Adjusted R
2 0.83  0.89  Adjusted  R
2 0.85  0.93 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown for simplicity. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level   49
Table 12 (Panel D): Credit Card Intensive Margins for Consumers and Merchants 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
































































Merchant acceptance by acquirer  
(MACCCit-1)X Number of credit cards in 










Merchant acceptance in the network 
(MACCCNt-1)X Number of credit cards 













- -  -  - - - 




- -  -  - 





Tourism (subsample of banks operating 
in most touristic areas) 
- - - - -  - -  
Adjusted R
2  0.67 0.94 0.67 0.95 0.66  0.93 0.66 0.92 
Subsample of banks operating in most touristic areas Subsample of banks operating in less touristic areas
Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCCit-1)X Number of credit 
cards in the network (CCARDSTNt-1) 
0.2159** 
(0.005) 
-  Merchant acceptance by acquirer (MACCCit-1)X Number of 




Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCCNt-1)X Number of 
credit cards by issuer (CCARDSit-1) 
- 0.1802** 
(0.002) 
Merchant acceptance in the network (MACCCNt-1)X Number of 




2 0.65  0.96  Adjusted  R
2 0.66  0.91 
Note: Only the main variables representing the exclusion restrictions are shown for simplicity. 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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